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Note
Compulsory Process and the War on Terror:
A Proposed Framework
Megan A. Healy∗
On December 11, 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft
announced the indictment of Zacarias Moussaoui, a selfconfessed member of al Qaeda, on six counts of conspiracy relating to the 9/11 attacks.1 Moussaoui remains the only person
charged in connection with the 9/11 attacks.2 Though the indictment contained grave accusations,3 the prosecution soon hit
a constitutional roadblock. Moussaoui invoked his constitutional right to compulsory process, requesting access to al
Qaeda members in U.S. custody to obtain exculpatory evidence.4 The government refused the request, citing national security concerns.5 This clash between the defendant’s constitu∗ J.D. Candidate 2007, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2002,
Concordia College, Moorhead, Minnesota. The author wishes to thank David
Leishman, Kelly Shroyer, Aaron Chapin, and the other editors of the Minnesota Law Review who offered comments and constructive criticism. Special
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Zoe Ann Parker Healy and Gerald Healy; grandparents Herbert and Marjorie
Parker; and Christopher Lindseth, for their love, support, and understanding.
The author dedicates this Note to the memory of her grandmother, Alma “Fay”
Healy. Copyright © 2006 by Megan A. Healy.
1. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Indicts
Moussaoui for September 11 Attacks (Dec. 11, 2001), http://www.usdoj.gov/
opa/pr/2001/December/01_ag_641.htm. Four of the charges carry the penalty
of death, while two qualify for a maximum of life in prison. Id.
2. Viveca Novak, How the Moussaoui Case Crumbled, TIME, Oct. 27,
2003, at 32, 32.
3. See Press Release, supra note 1.
4. Susan Schmidt, Prosecution of Moussaoui Nears a Crossroad: Facing
Demands for Witness Testimony, Government May Turn Suspect Over to U.S.
Military, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2003, at A8; Philip Shenon, Court Papers Show
Moussaoui Seeks Access to Captured Al Qaeda Members, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1,
2002, at A20.
5. Jerry Markon, U.S. Admonished in Terror Case: Government Must
Give Moussaoui Relevant Material, Judge Says, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2003, at
A9.
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tional right to compulsory process and the government’s national security interests emerged as the focal point of the case.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees all criminal defendants
the right to compulsory process, stating that “the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor.”6 Compulsory process grants “criminal
defendants the subpoena power [of the court] for obtaining witnesses in their favor.”7 This right implicitly embodies the right
to discover exculpatory evidence in the possession of the government.8 Unlike other Sixth Amendment rights, compulsory
process does not require the government to adhere to certain
standards by which criminal trials must proceed, but rather
functions wholly upon the defendant’s initiative and affords
him affirmative aid to present his defense.9
The Fourth Circuit’s ruling in United States v. Moussaoui10
marked the first time that a federal appellate court addressed
the issue of protecting a terrorism defendant’s right to compulsory process since the 9/11 attacks and the advent of the War
on Terror. The Fourth Circuit employed a balancing test in an
attempt to protect both Moussaoui’s right to compulsory process and the government’s asserted national security interest.11
Because the ultimate resolution of this case came from a guilty
plea, the Supreme Court has not articulated a framework dictating how to effectuate the compulsory process rights of terrorism defendants in the civilian criminal justice system.
This Note analyzes the Supreme Court’s compulsory process jurisprudence and proposes a constitutional framework for
fulfilling a defendant’s right to compulsory process in the context of the War on Terror. Part I describes the evolution of
compulsory process jurisprudence in the United States. Part II

6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
7. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 306 (8th ed. 2004).
8. See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 671 (1957) (“‘So far as [lawfully suppressed documents] directly touch the criminal dealings, the prosecution necessarily ends any confidential character the documents may possess . . . .’” (quoting United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir.
1944) (Hand, J.))); United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34 (Marshall, Circuit
Justice, C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d) (“In the provisions of the constitution . . . which give to the accused a right to the compulsory process of the
court, there is no exception whatever.”).
9. Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 73,
74 (1974).
10. 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 931 (2005).
11. See id. at 469–76.
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details the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Moussaoui. Three sections compose the framework proposed in Part III: Part III.A
calls for a rejection of the current balancing test in favor of a
per se rule as the constitutional standard for all compulsory
process cases; Part III.B incorporates the current constitutional
standard of materiality with respect to compulsory process in
terrorism cases; and Part III.C outlines remedies for violations
of the right to compulsory process appropriate to the context of
the War on Terror. Finally, Part III.D applies this new framework to Moussaoui. This Note concludes that the government
cannot circumscribe a criminal defendant’s constitutional right
to compulsory process in the civilian criminal justice system by
pleading national security: once a defendant meets the materiality threshold, the government must produce the requested
exculpatory evidence or accept the consequences of violating
the defendant’s right to compulsory process.12
I. THE LAW OF COMPULSORY PROCESS
Any discussion of compulsory process must begin with an
overview of its jurisprudential development. This examination
recounts the development of the compulsory process doctrine
from its inception at common law through its incorporation into
the U.S. Constitution. It then discusses judicial interpretation
of the clause and details the scope and limitations of compulsory process. Finally, it analyzes the constitutional tests that
have emerged from Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, a sister clause to compulsory process. Part I reveals that, until recently, the Supreme Court advanced a robust compulsory process doctrine, holding this and other Sixth Amendment rights
paramount in ensuring a fair trial.
A. HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF COMPULSORY PROCESS
The emergence of compulsory process paralleled the transformation of the justice system from an inquisitional to an adversarial process.13 By the early 1400s, the jury trial had assumed its modern function, with jurors deciding guilt or
12. This Note addresses the prosecution of terrorism defendants in the
civilian criminal justice system. It does not preclude the possibility of prosecuting terrorism defendants in a military tribunal established under the
President’s war powers. While there may be serious constitutional issues inherent in such a prosecution, this Note focuses instead on the constitutional
issues presented by a prosecution in an Article III court.
13. Westen, supra note 9, at 78.
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innocence based on the testimony of independent witnesses
produced by the Crown.14 However, the defendant possessed
few rights to guard against prosecutorial abuse and to rebut
the accusations against him.15 The system forbade defendants
from producing witnesses, either voluntarily or through a
summons, to testify on their behalf.16 This system left criminal
trials during the 16th century “primarily one-sided inquests
into the truth of the prosecution’s charges.”17
While the common law rule regarding defense witnesses
gradually evolved, affording the defendant more procedural
rights,18 not until the 1600s did the accused receive limited
power to subpoena witnesses and have them sworn before the
courts.19 Throughout the 1600s, the right to compulsory process
developed rapidly, driven by the famous treason trial of Sir
Walter Raleigh and a backlash against governmental abuses.20
Completing the transition from an inquisitional to an adversarial system, Parliament passed the Bill of Rights in 1689, codifying many criminal-procedure rights later embodied in the
American Bill of Rights—including the right to compulsory
process.21
B. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COMPULSORY PROCESS IN THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION
The right to compulsory process followed the colonists from
England to the American colonies and developed contemporaneously with English common law.22 The fact that nine of the
thirteen colonies explicitly included the right to compulsory
process when drafting their constitutions following independ-

14. Id. at 80–81.
15. As Peter Westen notes, the Crown denied defendants knowledge of the
charges against them until the day of the trial, the right to counsel, the right
to confront witnesses, and the right to present either voluntary or compelled
witnesses in their favor. See id. at 82. The Sixth Amendment embodies these
criminal procedure rights. See U.S. CONST. amend VI.
16. Westen, supra note 9, at 83–85.
17. Id. at 82.
18. See id. at 82–87.
19. See id. at 85–87.
20. See id. at 87–90.
21. See 9 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 230–36 (2d
ed. 1938); Westen, supra note 9, at 89.
22. See FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 13–
30 (1951).
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ence demonstrates the pervasive presence of compulsory process in the common law.23 By the time the Framers set out to
draft the Constitution, the evolution of common law had “firmly
entrenched” the right to compulsory process in the American
criminal-procedure scheme,24 representing the “culmination of
a long-evolving principle that the defendant should have a
meaningful opportunity, at least on par with that of the prosecution, to present a case in his favor through witnesses.”25
As such, the Framers codified criminal-procedure safeguards in the Constitution26 to protect those rights which they
believed England had violated.27 However, some feared that including only a trial-by-jury clause28 would insufficiently protect
an accused rights as they existed at common law and thus demanded that these rights be more clearly articulated in an
amendment to the Constitution.29 To quell these fears as to the
right to compulsory process, James Madison, the architect of
the Sixth Amendment,30 incorporated the following text: “In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.”31
C. EARLY INTERPRETATION OF COMPULSORY PROCESS
While documents from the founding era do not explain
Madison’s reasons for phrasing this clause as he did,32 contem23. See generally 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUHISTORY 179–379 (1971) (providing an exposition into American
colonies’ postindependence constitutions).
24. ALFREDO GARCIA, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT IN MODERN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE: A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE 115 (2002).
25. Westen, supra note 9, at 78.
26. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
27. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 20–21 (U.S. 1776)
(listing denial of criminal procedural rights among the grievances justifying
the colonies’ split from England).
28. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
29. See Westen, supra note 9, at 96–97.
30. See GARCIA, supra note 24, at 115.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Professor Westen notes that records do not
contain Madison’s reasons for drafting the Compulsory Process Clause with
this particular wording. While the rest of the Sixth Amendment language
closely paralleled the language of state constitutions, this clause is loosely
comparable only to Blackstone’s Commentaries. See Westen, supra note 9, at
97. On the other hand, Francis Heller suggests that, in composing the Sixth
Amendment, Madison considered the compulsory process clauses of each state
constitution and formulated a hybrid to satisfy all states and offend none. See
HELLER, supra note 22, at 21–30.
32. See Westen, supra note 9, at 97.
MENTARY
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porary reactions to the clause shed light on its original meaning. Congress and the states adopted the Compulsory Process
Clause practically without comment or substantive change.33
The paucity of debate regarding the narrow construction of the
text leaves the impression that Madison’s contemporaries did
“not appear to have attached any significance to the narrow
wording of the compulsory process clause.”34 These observations support the theory that the U.S. Constitution codified the
meaning of the right at common law.
In addition to gleaning the original meaning of the right
from historical documents, an early judicial interpretation offers insight as to how courts understood the right at that time.
Chief Justice Marshall’s “sweeping construction” of compulsory
process in the trial of Aaron Burr shows that the original understanding of the right was not limited to the literal text of the
amendment, but also considered contextual factors.35 In 1807,
allegations regarding Burr’s loyalty arose in letters from General James Wilkinson to President Thomas Jefferson.36 Jefferson informed Congress that Burr intended to take over the
Western states, invade Mexico to provoke a war with Spain,
and establish a new state.37 During his trials for treason and a
misdemeanor, Burr moved to compel Jefferson and the U.S. attorney to produce the letters,38 alleging that the information
contained therein “‘[m]ay be material to his defence.’”39 Jefferson refused to produce the letters, citing executive privilege.40
Chief Justice Marshall, sitting as the trial judge, held that
no witness, even the President, could claim an exemption from
the provisions of the Sixth Amendment.41 Additionally, Marshall construed the text of the clause, which referred only to
33. Id. at 98.
34. Id. at 98–100.
35. See id. at 101 & n.128 (referencing United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas.
187 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694); United States v.
Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d)).
36. See id. at 102.
37. Id.
38. See id. at 103. At least two subpoenas were issued, one to Jefferson on
June 13 for an October 21 letter and one to the U.S. attorney on September 4
for the November 12 letter. Id.
39. Id. (quoting 1 DAVID ROBERTSON, REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF COLONEL AARON BURR 132, 136–43, 149–50 (Philadelphia, Hopkins & Earle 1808))
(alterations in original) (emphasis omitted).
40. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 31.
41. Id. at 33–34 (noting that every criminal defendant has a right, as a
matter of course, to the use of compulsory process).
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process for “witnesses,” to encompass the right to compel a witness to produce documents.42 He also interpreted the right to
compulsory process to include a standard of materiality, requiring a defendant to make a credible showing that the information or witnesses sought will provide material assistance to his
defense before invoking the right to compulsory process.43
D. REVIVAL OF COMPULSORY PROCESS JURISPRUDENCE:
THE MODERN INTERPRETATION
Marshall’s broad interpretation of compulsory process
stood largely untouched for more than 150 years until the Supreme Court resurrected the Compulsory Process Clause as the
foundation for its decision in Washington v. Texas.44 Washington characterized compulsory process as a “fundamental element of due process law” and likened it to the right to present a
defense.45 This characterization—recognition of compulsory
process as a fundamental right—set off a revival of compulsory
process jurisprudence.
A Texas jury convicted Jackie Washington of murder.46 He
argued that he did not shoot the victim and that he tried to dissuade his codefendant, Fuller, from shooting him.47 Fuller’s testimony would have corroborated Washington’s testimony, exculpating Washington.48 However, to prevent fabricated
testimony by codefendants, Texas state law forbade Fuller from
testifying.49 As a result, the court convicted Washington of
murder.50
Upon review, the Supreme Court first held that the right to
compulsory process was incorporated by the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.51 In strong terms, the Court
placed the defendant’s right to compulsory process on an equal

42. Id. at 35 (“The literal distinction which exists between the cases is too
much attenuated to be countenanced in the tribunals of a just and humane
nation.”).
43. Id. at 35–36 (requiring a special affidavit showing the materiality of
the testimony before the access would be granted).
44. 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
45. Id. at 19.
46. Id. at 15.
47. Id. at 16.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 16–17, 20–21.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 17–19.
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level with other Sixth Amendment rights.52 The Washington
Court explained that a court’s interest in preventing perjury
yields to the defendant’s right to present “relevant, probative
evidence,” and that evidentiary rules preventing the jury from
hearing such evidence violate the defendant’s right to compulsory process.53 The Court found that the trial court “arbitrarily”
denied Washington his right to compulsory process by refusing
to allow him to present a witness who was “physically and mentally capable of testifying to events that he had personally observed, and whose testimony would have been relevant and
material to the defense.”54 Washington established that the fact
finder must hear testimony material to the defense despite the
possibility of presenting unreliable or perjured testimony.55
Implicit in this ruling is that the jury, not the judge, must
weigh the credibility of the witnesses produced by the defendant to support his defense.56
Throughout the 1970s, Supreme Court decisions established a robust compulsory process doctrine based on the interpretation promulgated in Washington. Webb v. Texas57 affirmed
the central tenet of Washington that the “defendant has a right
to present a defense coextensive with the prosecution’s right to
present its case,”58 and that it is up to the jury to decide “where
the truth lies.”59 In Chambers v. Mississippi, the Court determined that the defendant’s right to present witnesses in his defense trumped the procedural hearsay rule, effectively ruling
that substantive justice via compulsory process overrides procedure.60 Other cases upheld a defendant’s right to compulsory
process over a conflicting state evidentiary rule, finding that
the substantive right of compulsory process trumped the state’s

52. Id. at 18.
53. GARCIA, supra note 24, at 128.
54. 388 U.S. at 23.
55. Id. at 21.
56. See GARCIA, supra note 24, at 119; cf. Cool v. United States, 409 U.S.
100, 104 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that instructing a jury to consider evidence from a defense witness only if extremely reliable violates the Sixth
Amendment right to present to the jury exculpatory testimony of an accomplice per Washington v. Texas).
57. 409 U.S. 95 (1972) (per curiam).
58. GARCIA, supra note 24, at 119.
59. Webb, 409 U.S. at 98.
60. 410 U.S. 284, 292–93 (1972); see also GARCIA, supra note 24, at 120
(noting that the effect of Chambers was to allow “the right to present a defense
[to triumph] over strict fealty to procedure”).
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interest in procedural regularity.61
The most high-profile case in this line of cases, United
States v. Nixon, reaffirmed the central holding of the Burr
cases.62 The Court held that compulsory process trumps claims
of executive privilege: “To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory process be
available for the production of evidence needed either by the
prosecution or by the defense.”63
E. DEFINING THE SCOPE OF COMPULSORY PROCESS
Like other Sixth Amendment guarantees, the right to compulsory process is a fundamental, though not absolute, right.64
Although the Supreme Court gave a sweeping construction to
the clause in Washington v. Texas, it has imposed limits on the
right for a variety of reasons. For the purposes of this Note, the
limitations regarding materiality, unavailable witnesses, and
the balancing of interests provide particular insight.
1. Standard of Materiality
A materiality standard prevents defendants from gaming
the system by demanding irrelevant information and placing a
substantial burden on prosecutorial resources. Since United
States v. Burr, courts have required a defendant to show that
the information sought via compulsory process is material to
his defense.65
The Court laid down the roots of the modern constitutional
standard of materiality in Brady v. Maryland, a due process
case.66 Under Brady, the defendant may discover information
when the evidence is both “favorable to an accused” and “material.”67 Evidence is “material” under the Brady line of cases
when there is “a reasonable probability that its disclosure
61. See, e.g., Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 (1987); Crane v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 683, 690–91 (1986).
62. 418 U.S. 683, 713, 715–16 (1974).
63. Id. at 709.
64. See, e.g., Rock, 483 U.S. at 52–55.
65. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 36 (Marshall, Circuit Justice,
C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d) (requiring a special affidavit showing the materiality of the testimony before granting access to the evidence); see also FED.
R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(C) (permitting the defendant to inspect and copy evidence
in the possession of the government that is “material to the preparation of his
defense”).
66. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
67. Id.
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would have produced a different result.”68 In United States v.
Bagley, the Court unified the case law to form the current constitutional standard of materiality, which requires that evidence sought through compulsory process be “favorable to the
accused,” “material,” and that a “reasonable probability” exists
that a different outcome would have resulted from its disclosure.69 In the Sixth Amendment context, the Court defined
such reasonable probability as “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”70 In formulating this standard, the Court rejected a sliding scale of materiality.71 The
Brady standard requires a reviewing court to examine the totality of the circumstances to ascertain if the evidence would
have been material to the defense, keeping in mind the effect of
the nondisclosure of material evidence on the defense’s trial
strategy.72
The Court has not developed a specific test of materiality
in the compulsory process context. Rather, the Court relies on
the due process standard that has evolved from Brady and its
progeny. In Washington v. Texas, the Court determined that it
was “undisputed” that exculpatory testimony by Washington’s
codefendant was “relevant,” “material,” and “vital” to the defense and that its exclusion violated Washington’s constitutional rights.73
In the context of classified information, courts consistently
have held that “[i]n appraising materiality, the court is not to
consider the classified nature of the evidence.”74 In one such
case, the Court determined that the government’s privilege in
classified information must give way to a defendant’s right to
such information upon a showing that the evidence sought “is
relevant and helpful to the defense . . . or is essential to a fair
determination of a cause.”75 Once a defendant satisfies this

68. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 422 (1995); see also United States v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (articulating an identical formulation of materiality).
69. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
70. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (examining an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under the Sixth Amendment).
71. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682–83.
72. Id.
73. 388 U.S. 14, 16 (1967).
74. United States v. Juan, 776 F.3d 256, 258 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)
(citing United States v. Collins, 720 F.2d 1195, 1199 (11th Cir. 1983)).
75. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60–61 (1957).
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standard, the government must disclose the information.76
2. Unavailable Witnesses
The court’s process power will reach an unavailable witness if that person’s location is known—even if the witness is in
another state77—or if the government holds the person in custody.78 Compulsory process does not require the State to produce a witness if the witness’s unavailability is not the result of
a state action, such as the witness’s death, disability, sickness,
or disappearance.79
Prior to 1982, if the State made a witness unavailable the
Court required the State to produce the witness. However, in
1982 the Court decided United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal.80 In
this case, the government deported two witnesses before the defense had an opportunity to speak with them, knowing that
both deportees had witnessed the defendant allegedly commit
the crime.81 An assistant U.S. attorney determined that neither
witness was “material” to the defense.82 The Court held that
the deportation of witnesses who may provide relevant evidence for the defense did not violate the Compulsory Process
Clause per se.83 Absent a showing that the lost testimony con76. See United States v. Fernandez, 913 F.2d 148, 154 (4th Cir. 1990).
77. See Unif. Act To Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a
State in Criminal Proceedings § 2, 11 U.L.A. 10–11 (2003); see also, e.g., Maryland v. Breeden, 634 A.2d 464, 469 (Md. 1993) (discussing briefly the history
and purpose of the Uniform Act To Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from
Without a State in Criminal Proceedings).
78. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (2000); United States v. Cruz-Jiminez, 977
F.2d 95, 99–100 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding that when a defendant asserts his
Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process to obtain the testimony of an
incarcerated witness, the witness’s testimony may be obtained by the issuance
of a testimonial writ).
79. See Taylor v. Minnesota, 466 F.2d 1119, 1122 (8th Cir. 1972) (holding
that the trial court is not required to grant a continuance when, despite the
State’s serving officer’s due diligence, the witnesses cannot be found); United
States v. Rhodes, 398 F.2d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 1968) (deceased witness); United
States ex rel. Parson v. Anderson, 354 F. Supp. 1060, 1073–74 (D. Del. 1972)
(dictum) (witness with amnesia); see also Peter Westen, Confrontation and
Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91
HARV. L. REV. 567, 575–79 (1978) (discussing the limits of the Confrontation
Clause and the extent to which any given witness is “available”).
80. 458 U.S. 858 (1982).
81. Id. at 861.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 872. This ruling was a shift from earlier case law that applied a per se rule to similar fact situations. See, e.g., United States v. Tsutagawa, 500 F.2d 420, 423 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding a violation of the defendant’s
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stitutes evidence “material and favorable” to the defense, the
Court held that no compulsory process violation occurred.84
3. Compulsory Process Versus Governmental Interests:
The Implementation of a Balancing Test
In addition to modifying the unavailable witness rule, the
Valenzuela-Bernal Court implemented a balancing test that
significantly altered the constitutional standard for determining when the government must afford compulsory process to
the defendant. For the first time, the Court manifested a willingness to weigh a defendant’s right to compulsory process
against governmental interests.85 Specifically, the Court
weighed the government’s interest in not holding aliens who
“possess no material evidence relevant to a criminal trial”
against the defendant’s constitutional right to compulsory process.86
The Court found that, as a matter of prosecutorial discretion, the government, rather than the defendant, could ascertain whether or not the witness could provide evidence material
to the defense before ordering the witness’s deportation.87 To
challenge the prosecution’s decision, the defendant must make
a showing of materiality without access to the witness.88 The
Court recognized the significant burden involved in making
this showing but found that the “task is not an impossible
one.”89 The Court found that the government’s bureaucratic interest in not holding aliens until the defendant could assess the
materiality of their testimony outweighed the defendant’s right
to compulsory process.90
In 1988, the Court decided Taylor v. Illinois, in which defense counsel violated a discovery rule that required the defendant to disclose the names and addresses of the witnesses he
intended to call at trial.91 Employing a balancing test, the

right to compulsory process when the government deported a prospective defense witness without considering the defendant’s interest in the witness’s
presence at trial).
84. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 872–73.
85. Id. at 864–65.
86. Id. at 865.
87. Id. at 872–73.
88. Id. at 873.
89. Id. at 871.
90. See id. at 872–73.
91. 484 U.S. 400, 403 (1988).
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Court determined that the countervailing public interests in
the integrity and reliability of the judicial process outweighed
the defendant’s constitutional right to compulsory process.92 In
effect, the Court decided that the defense counsel’s procedural
error effectively forfeited the defendant’s right to compulsory
process. In reaching its decision, the Court noted that the public has an “interest in a full and truthful disclosure of critical
facts.”93 The Court also held that the discovery violation justified the preclusion of otherwise admissible evidence, even
though this remedy resulted in a denial of the defendant’s constitutional right.94
F. THE SISTER CLAUSE: THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
The Compulsory Process Clause goes hand-in-hand with
the Confrontation Clause: one provides access to witnesses that
will exculpate a defendant, and the other requires the State to
produce witnesses that inculpate the defendant.95 Both rights
developed through common law, accompanying the transition
from an inquisitorial to an accusatorial criminal justice system.96 Though excellent legal scholarship has fully vetted the
relationship between, and concurrent development of, these
clauses,97 a brief overview of the Court’s approach to resolving
confrontation cases lends insight into what constitutional tests
the Court may impose to resolve future compulsory process
cases.
In the seminal case on the Confrontation Clause, Mattox v.
United States,98 the Supreme Court formulated a per se rule by
relying on the original meaning and scope of the clause.99 The
Court held that, absent an exception recognized at common
law, direct confrontation of the accuser alone satisfied the de92. See id. at 412–14.
93. Id. at 412.
94. Id. at 402.
95. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
96. See generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42–50 (discussing
the history and purpose of the Confrontation Clause).
97. See, e.g., Westen, supra note 79 passim (discussing the relationship
between the Compulsory Process Clause and the Confrontation Clause).
98. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
99. See id. at 243–44; see also Margaret M. O’Neil, Comment, Crawford v.
Washington: Implications for the War on Terrorism, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1077,
1082 (2005) (discussing the impact of Mattox on the balance between respecting a defendant’s confrontation right and the admittance of reliable hearsay
evidence to facilitate the court’s truth finding function).
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fendant’s right to confrontation.100 In this case, the Court allowed stenographic notes of prior testimony from an unavailable witness.101 Because the defendant previously had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness, the Court admitted the
notes into evidence, drawing an analogy to the common law exception for dying declarations.102
The Court shifted directions in Ohio v. Roberts, abandoning the constitutional requirement of direct confrontation.103
The Court moved further from the requirement of direct confrontation in Maryland v. Craig when Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court, found that direct confrontation was “not the
sine qua non of the . . . right.”104 Justice O’Connor implemented
a balancing test to determine whether foregoing direct confrontation served public interest sufficiently to justify abrogating
the right to confrontation.105
Recently, however, the Court made an about-face with respect to testimonial evidence in Crawford v. Washington.106
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion abandoned the balancing test
from the Roberts-Craig line of reasoning.107 Instead, the Court
returned to the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause
by recognizing that the only constitutionally sufficient means of
assessing reliability was to afford the defendant an opportunity
to directly confront his accuser.108 To effectuate this standard,
the Court held that prior testimonial evidence is inadmissible,
unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a
prior opportunity for cross-examination.109 In so holding, the
Court rejected the balancing test and re-embraced a per se rule
requiring the government to produce witnesses to directly confront the accused.110
100. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243–44.
101. Id. at 244.
102. Id. at 243–44.
103. 448 U.S. 56, 62–65 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 56 (2004).
104. 497 U.S. 836, 847 (1990).
105. Id. at 855.
106. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
107. Id. at 63 (calling the previous framework so “unpredictable” that it
fails to “provide meaningful protection from even core confrontation violations”).
108. Id. at 68–69.
109. Id. at 68.
110. Id. This ruling did not overrule the common law exceptions to direct
confrontation. Id.
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From its inception at common law through its incorporation into the U.S. Constitution, the right to compulsory process
emerged as a key element in the adversarial process. Judicial
interpretations adopted a broad interpretation of compulsory
process while refining its constitutional contours. Despite the
implementation of a balancing test in Valenzuela-Bernal allowing courts to weigh governmental interests against the defendant’s constitutional right,111 compulsory process has remained
a vital right for criminal defendants. By September 11, 2001,
the right to compel the production of witnesses in the defendant’s favor had served as a vital tool for criminal defendants
in the civilian criminal justice system for 200 years.
II. COMPULSORY PROCESS VERSUS NATIONAL
SECURITY: UNITED STATES V. MOUSSAOUI
On August 16, 2001, the FBI arrested Zacarias Moussaoui
on immigration charges112 following a tip by an alert flight instructor in Eagan, Minnesota.113 Worried that Moussaoui intended to use this flight training for a violent purpose, the FBI
branch in Minnesota attempted to secure a warrant to search
his laptop and belongings, but the Washington office denied the
request, citing lack of evidence.114 The 9/11 attacks gave new
significance to Moussaoui’s arrest and provided the evidence
needed to obtain a search warrant.115
A. THE PROSECUTION HITS A SNAG: THE CONSTITUTION AND
THE WAR OVER WITNESSES
From the beginning, Moussaoui disclaimed any involvement in, or knowledge of, the 9/11 attacks. To prove these assertions, he sought access to the architects of those attacks in
111. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 864–65 (1982).
112. Novak, supra note 2, at 34.
113. Press Release, Pan Am Int’l Flight Acad., Pan Am International Flight
Academy Statement to the News Media, http://www.panamacademy.com/
template_press.asp?id=119 (last visited Apr. 24, 2006). The Minneapolis Star
Tribune quoted the flight instructor as telling the FBI, “Do you realize how
serious this is? . . . This man wants training on a 747. A 747 fully loaded with
fuel could be used as a weapon!” Greg Gordon, A Persistent Suspicion: Eagan
Flight Trainer Wouldn’t Let Unease About Suspect Rest, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), Dec. 21, 2001, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
114. Romesh Ratnesar & Michael Weisskopf, How the FBI Blew the Case,
TIME, June 3, 2002, at 24, 26, 29 (referencing a memorandum from Special
Agent Colleen Rowley to FBI Director Robert Mueller).
115. See id. at 29.
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U.S. custody.116 On September 11, 2002, U.S. forces captured
Ramzi bin al-Shibh, an alleged coordinator of the 9/11 attacks.117 Moussaoui immediately sought to depose bin al-Shibh,
but the government refused to provide access to bin al-Shibh,
citing national security concerns.118
On January 30, 2003, relying on the guidelines set forth in
the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA),119 the district court ordered the government to produce the requested
witness in the form of a videotaped deposition pursuant to Rule
15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.120 The government objected, but the district court concluded that Moussaoui’s Sixth Amendment right to compel witnesses outweighed
the government’s asserted national security interest.121 While
the government pursued an interlocutory appeal of this order,122 coalition forces captured the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,123 and Moussaoui quickly
moved to depose him.124 Mohammed reportedly informed his
interrogators that Moussaoui played no role in the 9/11 plan.125
The Fourth Circuit remanded the case to allow the government to propose substitutions that would both ensure
Moussaoui’s right to a fair trial and protect the government’s
national security interests.126 However, the district court rejected the government’s offer to produce heavily redacted reports of interrogations conducted by U.S. interrogators, finding
them inaccurate, incomplete, and unreliable.127 On July 14,
116. See Philip Shenon, U.S. Will Defy Court’s Order in Terror Case, N.Y.
TIMES, July 15, 2003, at A17.
117. Novak, supra note 2, at 34.
118. Id.
119. 18 U.S.C. app. 3 (2000 & Supp. 2004).
120. United States v. Moussaoui, No. CR. 01-455-A, 2003 WL 21263699, at
*5–6 (E.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2003), appeal dismissed, 333 F.3d 509 (4th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Moussaoui, No. 01-455-A (E.D. Va. Jan. 31, 2003) (order denying in part and granting in part defense motions to compel discovery) (under
seal) (discussing FED. R. CRIM. P. 15).
121. Moussaoui, 2003 WL 21263699, at *5–6.
122. See Jerry Markon, Moussaoui Trial Postponed for Third Time, WASH.
POST, Feb. 13, 2003, at A8.
123. See Novak, supra note 2, at 34–35.
124. Id.
125. See Susan Schmidt & Ellen Nakashima, Moussaoui Said Not To Be
Part of 9/11 Plot, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2003, at A4.
126. United States v. Moussaoui, No. 03-4162, 2003 WL 1889018, at *1
(4th Cir. Apr. 14, 2003).
127. See United States v. Moussaoui, No. CRIM. 01-455-A, 2003 WL
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2003, the government filed an affidavit stating that it planned
to defy the court’s order to produce bin al-Shibh for deposition.128 The government argued that producing a confessed 9/11
conspirator, “‘would necessarily result in the unauthorized disclosure of classified information’ and that ‘such a scenario is
unacceptable.’”129
Both the United States and Moussaoui argued for dismissal to expedite an appeal to the Fourth Circuit.130 However,
the district court, analogizing the situation to cases under
CIPA, found dismissal inappropriate131 and imposed sanctions
on the government for defying the court’s orders.132 The court
removed the death penalty133 and prohibited evidence referring
to the 9/11 attacks.134 The government appealed to the Fourth
Circuit.135
B. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S RULING
The Fourth Circuit held that the Sixth Amendment’s Compulsory Process Clause applies to enemy combatant witnesses
in the custody of the U.S. government outside the United
States’ territorial boundaries.136 The Fourth Circuit held, for
the first time, that the testimonial writ reaches a foreign national in U.S. custody outside the territory of the United States
21277161, at *2 (E.D. Va. May 15, 2003).
128. See Shenon, supra note 116. The affidavit was filed by Attorney General John Ashcroft. Id.
129. Id. (quoting Attorney General John Ashcroft).
130. United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480, 482 (E.D. Va. 2003)
(referencing Standby Counsel’s September 20, 2003 Motion for Sanctions and
Other Relief ), vacated in part, 365 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004), amended, 382
F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 931 (2005).
131. Id. at 482–83 (explaining that the presumption for dismissal under
CIPA was not appropriate here because it was impractical for the court to
make a ruling on the admissibility of testimony, as contemplated by CIPA,
when that testimony had not been obtained).
132. See id. at 486–87.
133. Id. at 482, 487 (finding that, because the government had deprived
Moussaoui of the chance to present testimony that could defend his life, imposition of the death penalty would constitute a violation of due process).
134. Id. at 487 (finding that the government’s refusal to produce the witnesses would result in an unfair trial because the defendant would be “denied
the ability to present testimony from witnesses who could assist him in contradicting [the] accusations”).
135. See Brief for the United States at 1–2, United States v. Moussaoui,
365 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2003) (No. 03-4792).
136. See United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 464–65 (4th Cir. 2004),
cert. denied, 544 U.S. 931 (2005).
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so long as the ultimate custodian, in this case Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, was subject to the process power of the
district court.137 The court rejected the government’s arguments that the orders mandating production violated separation of powers principles by invading the Executive’s war powers.138
The court then held that the issuance of orders requiring
production of witnesses involved “the resolution of questions
properly—indeed, exclusively—reserved to the judiciary.”139 If
any separation of powers concerns arose from the orders, they
would stem from an impermissible burden placed on the government, the finding of which requires the court to balance the
competing interests.140 In conducting this balancing test, the
court found the framework provided by CIPA informative.141 It
held that, although the production of these witnesses imposed
substantial burdens on the government,142 such burdens could
not outweigh the finding that the witnesses possessed information material to the defense.143 Therefore, the court concluded,
the “choice is the Government’s whether to comply with those
orders or suffer a sanction.”144
The Fourth Circuit noted that dismissal of an indictment
generally constitutes the appropriate remedy when the government refuses to produce material evidence pursuant to a
court order.145 However, the court held that where “the Government has rightfully exercised its prerogative to protect national security,” no punitive sanction will apply.146 Rather, a

137. Id. at 463–66. A few months earlier, the Supreme Court in Rasul v.
Bush determined that the district court only needed jurisdiction over the detainee’s custodian to reach the detainee, regardless of the detainee’s citizenship. 542 U.S. 466, 478–79 (2004). Unlike the majority in Moussaoui, the Rasul Court did not draw the distinction between the testimonial writ, the
prosecutorial writ, and the writ of habeas corpus. See Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at
483 n.1 (Williams, J., concurring).
138. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 466.
139. Id. at 469.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 471 n.20 (noting that while CIPA did not apply to the January 30 and August 29, 2003 rulings, CIPA nonetheless provided a “useful
framework” for examining the issue).
142. See id. at 470–71.
143. See id. at 476.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id.
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“more measured approach” that takes into consideration national security interests is required.147
To frame this approach, the Fourth Circuit borrowed a
standard from CIPA.148 This standard allows the government to
prevent the disclosure of sensitive national security information “by proposing a substitute for the information, which the
district court must accept if it ‘will provide the defendant with
substantially the same ability to make his defense as would
disclosure of the specific classified information.’”149 The court
concluded that the district court erred in finding any substitution for actual statements inherently inadequate,150 but agreed
that the substitutions as proposed by the government insufficiently satisfied Moussaoui’s right.151 To remedy the substitutions so as to fulfill Moussaoui’s constitutional right, the court
found that summaries of classified information compiled from
interrogations of the witnesses “provide an adequate basis for
the creation of written statements that may be submitted to the
jury in lieu of the witnesses’ deposition testimony.”152
The court required that the statements follow the exact
language of the summaries as closely as possible.153 It ordered
Moussaoui to designate portions of the summaries for submission and gave the government an opportunity to respond by
submitting portions of the summaries the government thought
the rule of completeness requires.154 Based on this interactive
process, the circuit court believed that the district court would
compile a set of appropriate substitutions.155 Additionally, because the substitutions were summaries of statements made
over several months rather than actual statements, the district
court must inform the jury of the nature of the substitutions.156
147. See id.
148. See id. at 476–77.
149. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 477 (quoting 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(c)(1) (2000)).
150. See id. at 478. The court rejected the district court’s conclusion that no
substitute for depositions of the witnesses would adequately satisfy Moussaoui’s right to compulsory process. Id.
151. See id.
152. Id. at 479.
153. See id. at 480.
154. See id. at 480 n.35.
155. See id. at 480.
156. See id. at 478. The court stated that the jury should be informed that
the parties compiled substitutions “derived from reports [Redacted] of the witnesses. The instructions must account for the fact that members of the prosecution team have provided information and suggested [Redacted] The jury
should also be instructed that the statements were obtained under circum-
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The Fourth Circuit’s ruling exposed the difficulties inherent in prosecuting a terrorism defendant in the civilian criminal justice system. While the court effectuated Moussaoui’s
right to compulsory process in form, it gutted that right in substance. By employing a balancing test, the Fourth Circuit allowed asserted governmental interests to emasculate the defendant’s right to compulsory process. Thus, the court failed to
protect both Moussaoui’s constitutional rights and the government’s national security interest. This failure of our justice system calls for a new approach.
III. THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
The challenges our legal system faces since 9/11 require
the judiciary to protect constitutional rights in the most difficult of circumstances. The War on Terror presents challenges
never before encountered in our constitutional jurisprudence.
Although Fascism, Communism, and the Cold War brought
some of these issues to the fore, the 9/11 attacks forced Americans to examine the extent of our individual freedoms under
the Constitution as we have not had occasion to do since World
War II. At this crucial moment, the judiciary must provide a
steady voice and rely on the Constitution to keep our nation
grounded.
The framework proposed in this Note provides guidance on
how the courts can fulfill this role with respect to the right to
compulsory process. It allows the judiciary to maintain its independence from the political branches in the face of great public pressure to bend the rules to combat terrorism. From this
independent perspective, the judiciary will have the freedom to
vindicate an accused terrorist’s constitutional rights without
the pervasive pressure of public opinion bearing down on each
decision.
A. REJECTING THE BALANCING TEST: THE ARGUMENT FOR A
PER SE CONSTITUTIONAL RULE
Academics and even members of the Court have long criticized the Supreme Court’s reliance on balancing tests to circumscribe constitutional rights in the face of an opposing governmental interest.157 Balancing tests open the door for public
stances that support a conclusion that the statements are reliable.” Id.
157. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62–68 (2004) (rejecting
the use of a balancing test in the Confrontation Clause context).
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opinion to exert pressure on the Court either to eviscerate or
amplify constitutional rights. The implementation of such a
test to curb a defendant’s right to compulsory process is a recent aberration in compulsory process jurisprudence.158 The
text, history, and original and modern interpretations of compulsory process dictate that the Court should abandon the use
of a balancing test in all compulsory process cases, not only in
the context of the War on Terror. The Court should instead revert to a per se rule that grants a defendant access to all exculpatory evidence within courts’ process power, subject only to a
standard of materiality.
1. Early Interpretations of Compulsory Process Call for a Per
Se Rule
Constitutional interpretations must begin with the text itself. The Sixth Amendment is an imperative.159 The defendant
“shall enjoy the right to . . . compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor.”160 The express text of the Sixth
Amendment contains no exceptions or escape hatches for governmental interests: all defendants have a constitutional right
to compulsory process.161 However, a purely textual application
leaves many questions unanswered. For example, the text provides only for witnesses, not for documents or other evidence,
leading to the absurd result of calling witnesses into court
without access to documents or other evidence to substantiate
their testimony.162 The text also allows a defendant to compel
the testimony of any witness, regardless of the relevance of the
witness’s testimony. Accordingly, the Court has never handed
down such a literal interpretation of compulsory process. Instead, the Court has found the power to subpoena witnesses in-

158. See, e.g., Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 414–15 (1988) (determining
that the “countervailing public interests” in the integrity and reliability of the
judicial process outweighed the defendant’s constitutional right to compulsory
process); United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 864–65 (1982)
(implementing a balancing test to determine when the government must afford compulsory process to the defendant).
159. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; cf. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (expressly incorporating a reasonableness standard allowing for the use of a balancing
test).
160. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
161. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18–19 (1967); United States v.
Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 33–34 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No.
14,692d).
162. See Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 35.
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cludes the ancillary power to compel production of evidence in
their possession or control, as well as their thoughts, memories,
and opinions.163
The historical purpose of the right sheds light on the meaning of the text and clarifies these ambiguities.164 As discussed
in Part I, compulsory process emerged as a corollary of the
transition from an inquisitorial to an adversarial system.165
The idea of making the individual defendant equal to the State
drove the development of compulsory process.166 Because removing the governmental obstacles to a defendant’s right to
present his defense underpinned this development, an interpretation of compulsory process that allows the government to decide when and to what extent the defendant’s right exists in
any given case subverts the purpose of the right. Taken in context with the textual imperative, the historical purpose
strongly supports the rejection of a balancing test through
which governmental interests can eviscerate the right.
An examination of the original understanding of the Compulsory Process Clause commands the same conclusion as the
textual and historical interpretations. As Part I discussed, the
Declaration of Independence cited the denial of criminal procedural rights as a governmental abuse to strengthen its call for
independence.167 The Framers recognized the potential for governmental abuses and accordingly drafted the Constitution to
prevent governmental overreach. The Framers did not intend
for the rights of criminal defendants to ebb and flow with
changes in the Court’s membership or the political atmosphere
of the day. A balancing test allows such temporary changes to
lead to the dilution or denial of categorical constitutional
rights. This type of unchecked discretion was one of the factors
leading the Framers to declare independence from England in
the first place.
One could argue, counter to this interpretation, that the
Framers recognized the potential for governmental abuses, but
163. See, e.g., id. at 34–35 (holding that the right extends to writings); cf.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42–43 (2004) (finding the text of the
Confrontation Clause similarly insufficient to define the constitutional demands of that clause).
164. See, e.g., Washington, 388 U.S. at 19–22; Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 32–34; cf.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43–50 (relying extensively on the history of the Confrontation Clause to ascertain the correct demands of that clause).
165. See Westen, supra note 9, at 78.
166. See id. at 90.
167. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 20–21 (U.S. 1776).
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intended only to guard against arbitrary abuses.168 By choosing
such narrow wording, the Framers left the interpretation open
to extratextual considerations, including governmental interests.169 However, two counterarguments undermine this premise. First, while Madison’s narrow wording of the clause creates
doubt as to its scope, even scholars who disagree as to the purpose of the wording do not espouse the view that the Framers
intended to allow governmental interests to preempt the right
to compulsory process.170 Second, one need only look to a contemporary judicial opinion for a definitive interpretation of
compulsory process during the founding era.
The earliest judicial interpretation of the Compulsory
Process Clause, United States v. Burr, indicates that an individual defendant had the right to compulsory process for exculpatory information against the State, even when exposure of
sensitive security information resulted.171 While Burr involved
issues of executive privilege and compulsory process, and the
War on Terror involves national security concerns, in both
cases the nature of the information being compelled involves
sensitive state-security matters.172
In Burr, Marshall emphasized the solemnity of the constitutional right involved and gave a resounding affirmation of
compulsory process as a fundamental constitutional right to
168. For instance, the constitutional documents of most founding era
states, while varying in wording and detail, provided “guarantees against arbitrary practices in criminal proceedings.” HELLER, supra note 22, at 21.
169. See id. at 24–32 (describing the debates regarding the scope of the
amendment).
170. For example, Westen hypothesizes that Madison drafted the Compulsory Process Clause vaguely to build consensus by accommodating various
states’ interests. Westen, supra note 9, at 97–101. The Framers incorporated
this amendment in response to significant state pressure to protect citizens’
civil liberties, including the right to compulsory process, from abrogation by
the new, more powerful, federal government. Id. at 96. On the other hand,
Heller argues that contemporary documents offer no definitive explanation for
the language of the Sixth Amendment criminal procedure requirements.
HELLER, supra note 22, at 33. Nevertheless, Heller notes that England’s denial of these inviolable rights, which guarded against arbitrary state practices
in criminal proceedings, compelled the colonists to declare independence. Id.
at 21.
171. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34–35 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d).
172. Compare id. at 31–34 (requiring the President to supply a subpoenaed
letter from General James Wilkinson containing allegations questioning
Burr’s loyalty), with United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 458 (4th Cir.
2004) (concerning a subpoena to produce an al Qaeda member, an acknowledged “national security asset”), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 931 (2005).
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which no one, not even the President of the United States,
could claim an exemption.173 Though not explicit, a reasonable
reading of Burr shows that once the defendant makes a showing of materiality, governmental interests—even sensitive national security interests—cannot dilute the defendant’s right to
compulsory process.174 This reasoning further negates the justification for the Court’s current use of a balancing test to allow
the government’s interests to preempt a defendant’s right to
compulsory process.
Marshall’s interpretation in Burr, along with the textual,
historical, and original interpretations embraced by this
framework, conclusively call for the rejection of the balancing
test and the reinstatement of a per se rule to protect a defendant’s right to compulsory process.
2. The Modern Era Exposes Problems with the Balancing Test
Just as an examination of early interpretation concluded
that government interests cannot undermine a defendant’s
right to compulsory process, most modern interpretations of the
Compulsory Process Clause hold that the defendant’s right to
compulsory process automatically trump any attempted governmental claim of interest.175 The seminal modern compulsory
process case, Washington v. Texas, equated the underpinning of
the right to compulsory process with the fundamental right to
present a defense. As discussed in Part I, until 1982, compulsory process cases dismissed out of hand the government’s asserted interest, holding the defendant’s right to compulsory
process above state interests once the defendant meets the
standard of materiality.
The Court’s implementation of a balancing test in
Valenzuela-Bernal,176 and later in Taylor,177 deviated from the
long-standing per se rule laid down in Burr and its progeny. In
introducing a balancing test to this jurisprudence, the Court
essentially shifted compulsory process from a substantive constitutional right to a mere procedural rule that can be set aside

173. See Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 33–34.
174. See id.
175. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707–13 (1974); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294–303 (1972); Washington v. Texas, 388
U.S. 14, 17–19 (1967).
176. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867–71 (1982).
177. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410–16 (1988).
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when the government makes a strong enough showing of interest.178
Such a danger is even more present in the framework of
compulsory process in the War on Terror. The results in
Valenzuela-Bernal and Taylor demonstrate how easily a balancing test can lead to the evisceration of categorical constitutional rights, even when challenged by secondary governmental
interests.179 The War on Terror creates significant pressure in
our courts to subvert constitutional commands as a means of
combating terrorism. The danger that courts will succumb to
governmental claims of national security interests in a post9/11 world by denying individual defendants their constitutional rights leads down a path from which a return to constitutional rule of law is uncertain.
Some argue that the government must have the freedom
and flexibility to protect the nation in the face of terrorism.180
However, this fails to distinguish between the power necessary
to prevent a terrorist attack on the front end and the power to
convict a suspected terrorist on the back end. On the front end,
Congress and the President work together to pass statutes, appropriate funds, and establish specialized agencies.181 Most importantly, they accomplish these goals within the powers the
Constitution gives them.182
However, on the back end, the Constitution demands that
the government play by a different set of rules. The Constitution protects the defendant from governmental abuses and includes no affirmative grants of power to the government.183 Because such unprincipled tests leave far too much discretion in
the judiciary, the danger of public opinion and current trends
influencing courts’ application of constitutional rights advocate

178. See GARCIA, supra note 24, at 142 (discussing the Court’s shift to a
“sporting theory” of justice).
179. See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 408–09 (relying on the government’s asserted
interest in a reliable justice system); Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 872–73
(recognizing the government’s interest in deporting aliens).
180. See, e.g., United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 469–71 (4th Cir.
2004) (recognizing the government’s interest in national security), cert. denied,
544 U.S. 931 (2005).
181. See, e.g., Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40,
115 Stat. 224 (2001) (“Sept. 18th Authorization”); Homeland Security Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.
182. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, art. II, § 2.
183. See id. amends. IV, V, VI.
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against the use of a balancing test.184 Even in the short time
since the implementation of a balancing test,185 courts have begun to chip away at the compulsory process right.186 A per se
rule requires courts to comply with the Constitution’s categorical commands, diminishing the potential for outside influences
to undermine constitutional guarantees.
Since 9/11 and the ensuing War on Terror, the pressure to
dismiss defendant’s rights in the name of national security
weighs heavily upon the courts. Rejecting a balancing test and
reverting to a per se rule will ensure that the judiciary and the
government remain mindful that though a defendant is
charged with an act of terrorism, he is entitled to the same procedural safeguards and constitutional rights as any other defendant.
3. A Scaliaesque Approach
The Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence lends support to the proposed per se rule. As discussed in Part I, the interests involved in confrontation and compulsory process are
seamlessly intertwined. The Court’s approach to confrontation
sends a reasonably reliable message about its probable approach to compulsory process. For many years, the constitutional test for confrontation cases aligned with the constitutional test for compulsory process with each advocating the use
of a per se rule.187
However, in 1982 and again in 1990, the Court handed

184. Cf. Gerald E. Rosen, U.S. Dist. Court, Judge, The War on Terrorism in
the Courts (July 24, 2004), in 21 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 159, 163 (2004) (“At the
risk of sounding preachy, if those of us in the Judiciary allow ourselves to be
caught up in the public fervor surrounding terrorism, to view ourselves as part
of the government’s war on terror, and to tailor our decisions accordingly, the
terrorists will have won an important battle because they will have caused us
to be something less than who we are.”).
185. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867–71 (1982)
(establishing the compulsory process balancing test).
186. See, e.g., Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 415–16 (1988) (holding that
compulsory process does not bar courts from precluding the testimony of defendant’s witness as a sanction for a procedural violation); Valenzuela–Bernal,
458 U.S. at 873 (holding the Compulsory Process Clause not violated when the
government deported a witness before the defendant could interview that witness to establish materiality).
187. Compare Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 245–50 (1895) (employing a per se rule for Confrontation Clause cases), with Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17–19 (1967) (invoking a per se rule for compulsory process cases).
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down opinions construing both clauses. In these opinions, the
Court implemented a balancing test, weighing governmental
interests against the defendant’s rights to confrontation and
compulsory process.188 In each case, the Court determined that
the public interest sufficiently justified abrogating the defendant’s constitutional rights.189 As applied to the Confrontation
Clause, this dramatic shift in jurisprudence led to an increase
in litigation as lower courts tried to define the parameters of
the balancing test.
However, in Crawford v. Washington, the Court’s most recent confrontation decision, the Court handed down a clear-cut,
definitive confrontation rule.190 The Court relied heavily on the
historical purpose of the right to be confronted by witnesses to
reach the conclusion that employing a balancing test in the confrontation context offended the text of the Constitution and the
history of the right.191 Justice Scalia noted that “[b]y replacing
categorical constitutional guarantees with open-ended balancing tests, we do violence to their design.”192 The opinion resoundingly disposed of a balancing test and reinstated a per se
constitutional right to confront witnesses.193
Such a strong rejection of the balancing test in the confrontation context supports the call for a rejection of a balancing
test in compulsory process jurisprudence. The principles underpinning these rights parallel each other.194 The Court in
Crawford held that the balancing test diluted constitutional
guarantees by allowing public interests to interfere with categorical constitutional commands. The use of a balancing test in
the compulsory process context also has led to the obfuscation

188. Compare Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847–49 (1990) (interpreting
the Confrontation Clause to only establish a preference for face-to-face testimony at trial), with Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 865–66 (justifying the deportation of witnesses on public policy grounds).
189. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 860 (weighing the states interest in protecting
children against a defendants confrontation right); Valenzuela-Bernal, 458
U.S. at 872–73 (weighing the government’s interest in the prompt deportation
of illegal aliens against a defendants compulsory process right).
190. See 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004).
191. See id. at 42–56 (extensively reviewing the development of the Confrontation Clause over several hundred years to support the Court’s decision).
192. Id. at 67–68.
193. See id. at 63–68.
194. See Westen, supra note 79, at 567–68; Westen, supra note 9, at 73; see
also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47–52 (discussing the history and purpose of the
Confrontation Clause).
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of compulsory process rights.195 Because the constitutional development of these rights have mirrored each other, the Court’s
decision in Crawford to reject the balancing test in favor of a
per se rule strongly suggests that it would apply the same logic
to compulsory process.
The text, historical purpose, original interpretation, and
modern interpretation uniformly support the notion that the
right to compulsory process is a categorical constitutional right
that cannot be circumscribed by the state. As such, an ad hoc
balancing test that allows governmental interests, such as national security, to delineate access to compulsory process is
simply incorrect constitutional doctrine. Abandoning the balancing test and reinstating a per se rule vindicates the right to
compulsory process and ensures that all defendants receive the
constitutional rights afforded by our Constitution.
B. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD OF MATERIALITY
Through decades of decisions, the Supreme Court has developed the standard of materiality that defendants must meet
to gain access to exculpatory information via the Court’s process power. The Court consistently incorporates the general constitutional due process standard, determined by Brady and its
progeny, into compulsory process jurisprudence.196 Evidence
must be “favorable to an accused,” “material,” and show a “reasonable probability” that a different outcome would have resulted from disclosure of the evidence.197 A “reasonable probability” is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.”198 If the defense satisfies the Brady materiality
test, the government must disclose the information, classified
or not.199
One could argue that national security interests change
the equation and that courts must apply a heightened standard
when gauging the materiality of sensitive security informa-

195. See, e.g., Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 416–18 (1988); United States
v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 872–74 (1982).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 36
(Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d).
197. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682; Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
198. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 694 (1984)).
199. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (Compulsory Process Clause).
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tion.200 However, courts have already addressed national security challenges to this well-settled doctrine and consistently
have held that “[i]n appraising materiality, the court is not to
consider the classified nature of the evidence.”201 One Supreme
Court decision defined materiality in the context of classified
information as information that is “relevant and helpful to the
defense . . . or is essential to a fair determination of a cause.”202
However, an examination of case law shows that the Court has
used these terms in a variety of cases when applying the current constitutional standard.203 Therefore, the Court’s use of
this phrase does not denote a special standard of materiality for
classified information.
Not only does case law offer no support for a heightened
standard of materiality, but Congress also codified its view on
the subject in CIPA. CIPA supports the Court’s constitutional
standard of materiality with regards to classified information,
requiring courts to make the initial determination of relevance
without regard to the nature of the information.204 Thus, Congress joined the Court in requiring courts to determine materiality without considering the nature of the evidence.
In light of the well-settled nature of the law in this area,
this framework proposes adopting the constitutional standard
of materiality in the context of compulsory process challenges.
C. CRAFTING AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY
Once a court rules that the defendant has met the requisite
materiality standard, the court must provide a remedy to vindicate the violation of the defendant’s right if the government
continues to refuse to produce exculpatory information. When
crafting a remedy in the context of the War on Terror, one can-

200. The government in Moussaoui made similar arguments. See Brief for
the United States, supra note 135, at 39–45.
201. United States v. Juan, 776 F.2d 256, 258 (11th Cir. 1985); accord
United States v. Collins, 720 F.2d 1195, 1199 (11th Cir. 1983); United States
v. Lopez-Lima, 738 F. Supp. 1404, 1411 n.7 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
202. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60–61 (1957).
203. See, e.g., United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 37 (Marshall, Circuit
Justice, C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d) (stating that the court is unlikely to
deny a defendant access to evidence in possession of the government in a capitol case if such evidence is truly “essential to his defence”).
204. See Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-456, § 4, 94
Stat. 2025, 2025–26 (1980) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 4 (2000
& Supp. 2004)); Collins, 720 F.2d at 1199.
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not ignore the fact that the defendant will seek classified material involving national security interests.
This proposed framework shadows the CIPA framework205
and offers three levels of remedies for compulsory process violations involving terrorism defendants. At the trial level, an alternative to physical production of the witness crafted under
the CIPA framework satisfies a defendant’s compulsory process
rights. At the appellate level, provision for an interlocutory appeal allows the government to assert its valid interest in protecting national security without placing the defendant in a
jeopardy situation. Should the government fail at both levels to
provide access to exculpatory information in accordance with
these provisions, the only remaining remedy is dismissal.
1. Dismissal Is Inappropriate in the First Instance
When the government refuses to provide access to exculpatory evidence in its possession, courts ordinarily will dismiss
the indictment to prevent the violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights.206 Both the Supreme Court and Congress determined that the government’s interest in preventing the disclosure of classified information must give way to the
defendant’s right to present a defense.207 However, the discloseor-dismiss dilemma created by such a harsh remedy punishes
the government for fulfilling its duties as the protector of its
citizenry and demands a more just resolution.
One could contend that the imperative text of the Sixth
Amendment requires an immediate dismissal when the government refuses to comply with the court’s command.208 However, judges, not the Constitution, provide the remedies for
such violations. As such, courts have a greater degree of flexi205. See 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1–16.
206. See, e.g., Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 672 (1957); Roviaro,
353 U.S. at 61.
207. See 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(c)(1); United States v. Fernandez, 913 F.2d
148, 154 (4th Cir. 1990) (discussing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence of the
disclosure of classified information).
208. The general remedy, as well as the remedy under CIPA, for the violation of a defendant’s compulsory process rights caused by the government’s
refusal to produce a witness in violation of the district court’s order is dismissal of the indictment. See 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(e)(2); United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 484 n.3 (4th Cir. 2004) (Gregory, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); see also Peter Margulies, Above Contempt?: Regulating
Government Overreaching in Terrorism Cases, 34 SW. U. L. REV. 449, 479
(2005) (arguing that the Fourth Circuit should have upheld the district court’s
remedy, dismissing many of the charges against Moussaoui).
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bility to consider governmental interests when crafting an appropriate remedy than when deciding whether the government
violated a categorical constitutional right. Dismissal as a remedy for the violation of an individual’s rights subverts justice if
it decimates the security of the offending nation. If a less draconian remedy fully vindicates the individual’s rights, a court
may, in its discretion, consider an alternative remedy that does
not jeopardize the government’s national security interests.209
So long as the government’s refusal to produce exculpatory
evidence stems from its prerogative of protecting the nation’s
security, such a drastic sanction as dismissal does not serve the
ends of justice.210 Therefore, resolution of the conflict requires a
more just remedy, reserving dismissal as a remedy of last resort.
2. Substitutions Under the CIPA Framework
Because dismissal in the first instance offends justice, this
proposed framework suggests a substitution for actual production of the witness by analogizing to the CIPA framework. Any
analogy to CIPA must recognize that CIPA applies only to public disclosure of classified information at the trial stage, not to
disclosure of classified information to defense counsel at the
pretrial stage.211 However, having no binding legal precedent,
an analogy to the CIPA framework for crafting a substitution
for actual production of the witnesses or evidence in question
proves informative.212 Because CIPA is congressionally sanctioned and judicially tested, its procedures provide insight into
appropriate methods of producing classified evidence.
A pure Sixth Amendment analysis leads to unfettered access to material exculpatory information by the defense; however, such access clearly frustrates the government’s interest in
national security. To address this concern at trial, CIPA implicitly requires a balancing test when crafting an appropriate substitution for admissibility as evidence.213 In this context, after
209. See United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480, 482–83 (E.D.
Va. 2003), vacated in part, 365 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004), amended, 382 F.3d
453 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 931 (2005).
210. See 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(e)(2); Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 476.
211. See United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509, 514–15 (4th Cir. 2003).
212. See United States v. Moussaoui, No. CR. 01-455-A, 2003 WL
21263699, at *3 (E.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2003), appeal dismissed, 333 F.3d 509 (4th
Cir. 2003).
213. See id.
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the defendant has reviewed the evidence and determined what
he needs admitted for exculpatory purposes, employing a balancing test to determine the form of the evidence does not violate his right to compulsory process.214 So long as the court admits the substance of the evidence, the Constitution does not
prohibit a change in form to protect the government’s interest.
In this vein, CIPA authorizes a substitution to take the
place of complete access. However, such a substitution must
provide the defendant with “substantially the same ability to
make his defense as would disclosure of the specific classified
information.”215 In the CIPA context, courts have generally accepted substitutions, such as statements or summaries, in lieu
of the production of actual witnesses or documents.216 However,
courts generally cite a lack of specificity when finding substitutions inadequate to convey the evidence to the jury.217
If CIPA controlled the issue of compulsory process in the
context of the War on Terror, the defendant must accept sufficient summaries to satisfy his compulsory process rights, absent a finding of unconstitutionality.218 At this point, the proposed framework departs from CIPA. At trial, for which CIPA
provides a remedy, the government’s interest in preventing the
disclosure of classified information to the public weighs heavily
against a defendant’s right to present a defense in determining
the form of the substitution admitted into evidence. However,
in pretrial discovery, the fact that public disclosure is not imminent and that defense counsel must obtain a security clearance diminishes the government’s interest.219 Likewise, at such
an early stage, access to a form of evidence yielding the greatest amount of information from which a defendant can mount
his defense substantially enhances his interest.220
Because the defendant’s interest in the form of evidence is
so greatly enhanced at this early stage, only a substitution that
approximates actual access as nearly as possible vindicates the

214. Cf. id. (comparing CIPA’s legal framework to a defendant’s right to
bring witnesses to court).
215. 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(c).
216. See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 913 F.2d 148, 157 (4th Cir.
1990).
217. See, e.g., id. at 157–59.
218. See 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(c).
219. See id. §§ 4, 5, 9.
220. Cf. Margulies, supra note 208, at 478–79 (discussing the defendant’s
interest in an effective defense).
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defendant’s right to compulsory process. The defendant must
have within his reach the most accurate substitution for exculpatory evidence on which to build his case. Access to such material evidence alters defense strategy, leads to other forms of
exculpatory evidence, and, at the very least, serves as a mitigating factor for the defendant to use as a bargaining chip.
That being so, in the context of access to witnesses, a deposition—such as the video deposition ordered by the district
court in Moussaoui221—best satisfies the defendant’s right to
compulsory process, while creating a controlled environment to
protect the government’s national security interests. A video
deposition allows the defense not only to ask questions, but also
to follow up on answers as a means of uncovering additional exculpatory evidence or witnesses. This manner of deposition allows defense counsel to explore avenues of discussion left untouched by the government’s interrogators. This give-andtake—akin to informal witness interviews usually conducted by
defense counsel in criminal investigations—provides an essential tool in crafting a defense. While a video deposition most
closely approximates actual access to the witness and provides
the most compelling evidence, under the proposed framework a
deposition on written questions, reserving to the defense the
opportunity to follow up the answers with additional questions,
also satisfies the defendant’s right to compulsory process.222
On the other hand, summaries and substitutions, such as
those advocated by the Fourth Circuit in Moussaoui for example,223 fail as adequate substitutes for actual access at this
early stage of the prosecution. Such substitutions are not prepared for use by a defendant to present his defense, but as records of interrogation for government intelligence purposes.224
221. United States v. Moussaoui, No. 01-455-A (E.D. Va. Jan. 31, 2003)
(order denying in part and granting in part defense motions to compel discovery) (under seal).
222. Cf. id. (requiring a video deposition as the means to effectuate Moussaoui’s right to compulsory process). Nevertheless, because they more accurately substitute live testimony, video depositions are preferred if available.
Cf. Battle v. Mem’l Hosp. at Gulfport, 228 F.3d 544, 554 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that a video deposition was an adequate substitute for live testimony when
the witness was unavailable); United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1188
(5th Cir. 1982) (finding that a videotaped deposition, unlike a transcript, allows the fact finder to evaluate the witness by his motions, vocal inflections,
facial expressions, and demeanor).
223. United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 479–82 (4th Cir. 2004),
cert. denied, 544 U.S. 931 (2005).
224. Cf. Margulies, supra note 208, at 459–65 (discussing prosecutorial
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The interrogator’s prerogative does not align with the defendant’s desire to obtain exculpatory information. In pursuing
governmental objectives, the interrogator may find avenues of
inquiry fruitless for governmental purposes, unimportant for
the defense, or advantageous for the government to avoid.225
Additionally, without specific references to the defendant
prompted by direct questioning, the impact of any exculpatory
evidence is greatly diminished. The nature of the substitution
also frustrates the defendant’s use of such information by denying the opportunity to extract additional exculpatory information.
In Moussaoui, the government strenuously objected to this
framework’s proposed remedy by pleading national security.226
However, when examined under the strictures of the proposed
framework, this argument is not dispositive. First, the proposed framework does not require the government to disclose
the location of the witness—the government must only produce
him via a closed circuit link. Second, the framework quells the
government’s concern about the scope of the deposition by requiring defense counsel to limit the questions only to the witness’s direct knowledge of the defendant. The defendant can
glean all relevant ancillary information from the redacted
summaries of interrogations. Additionally, under CIPA, defense
counsel must prove their trustworthiness before gaining access
to classified information.227 Finally and most importantly,
when the time comes to determine the form of admissible evidence, CIPA governs the form of the evidence to prevent disclosure of sensitive security information.228 As this examination
shows, at this point in the prosecution and under these strict
guidelines, producing witnesses for depositions causes little, if
any, actual damage to national security.
Because of the government’s diminished interests and the
defendant’s enhanced interest at this early stage, requiring the
government to produce witnesses for depositions will not frustrate the government’s security interests and will fully vindimisconduct).
225. See id.
226. See Shenon, supra note 116.
227. See 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 4, 5, 9 (2000 & Supp. 2004).
228. See United States v. Moussaoui, No. CR. 01-455-A, 2003 WL
21263699, at *3 (E.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2003) (discussing the framework of CIPA,
“which governs the relevance, use and admissibility of classified information
at trial”), appeal dismissed, 333 F.3d 509 (4th Cir. 2003).
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cate the defendant’s rights. This element of the proposed
framework puts in place the mechanisms to accomplish both
goals without failing either.
3. Interlocutory Appeal
CIPA provides for an interlocutory appeal by the United
States when the district court orders disclosure of classified
evidence, the government refuses to comply with the order, and
the district court imposes sanctions.229 The Fourth Circuit in
United States v. Moussaoui analogized the CIPA framework to
cover interlocutory appeals at the pretrial stage in the context
of compulsory process in terrorism cases.230 However, in recognizing the availability of the appeal, it required that the appeal
come from a final order of the district court.231 The Court determined that finality meant that the district court issued an
order to disclose to which the government refused to comply
and for which the government suffered a sanction.232
The proposed framework adopts the methodology of the
Fourth Circuit and provides the government with an interlocutory appeal prior to the disclosure of any classified evidence. An
appeal will prolong the defendant’s receipt of exculpatory evidence, but a brief delay will not frustrate the defendant’s
right.233
4. When All Else Fails, Dismiss
Despite the serious implications of dismissing the indictment in terrorism cases, the government must accept the consequences of its refusal to provide access to exculpatory evidence as demanded by the Constitution. This framework
provides ample opportunity for the government to protect its
security interests, while still providing adequate disclosure of
exculpatory evidence to the defendant. As the Fourth Circuit
said, at this point, the choice is the government’s whether to
produce the evidence or to accept a sanction.234

229. See 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 7.
230. See United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509, 514–15 (4th Cir. 2003).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Cf. 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 7(b) (requiring an expedited appeal that must be
taken within ten days).
234. See United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 476 (4th Cir. 2004),
cert. denied, 544 U.S. 931 (2005).
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A refusal to participate in this process by producing witnesses for depositions signals that the government refuses to
prosecute defendants according to long-established constitutional rules. The Constitution does not grant Article III courts
the discretion to bend the rules for the government because the
defendant qualifies as a terrorist. If the government refuses to
comply with the remedy for the violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights by providing adequate substitutions, the
court will have no choice but to dismiss the indictment.
D. APPLYING THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK TO MOUSSAOUI
Finally, to exemplify how this proposed framework operates, this section applies the framework to the Moussaoui case.
To establish the materiality of the evidence that a particular
witnesses could offer, Moussaoui relied upon the heavily redacted summaries of interrogation interviews that the government made available to him.235 Because the arguments in this
case regarding materiality at the trial level occurred during a
closed hearing on January 30, 2003, the position advocated by
the defense on materiality is not clear.236 The district court
found that Moussaoui satisfied the constitutional materiality
standard as to two of the three witnesses.237
The record shows that the district court applied the constitutional standard of materiality set forth by the Brady line of
cases.238 Because the proposed framework advocates the adoption of the same standard of materiality, Moussaoui satisfied
the requisite standard of materiality under the proposed
framework.
This proposed framework permits no balancing of the interests to decide whether to allow access to the requested witnesses. The defendant must meet two requirements for access:
make the requisite showing of materiality of the evidence being
sought and show that the evidence is within the process power

235. Id. at 472, 478.
236. See United States v. Moussaoui, No. 01-455-A (E.D. Va. Jan. 31, 2003)
(order denying in part and granting in part defense motions to compel discovery) (under seal).
237. United States v. Moussaoui, No. CR. 01-455-A, 2003 WL 21263699, at
*4 (E.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2003), appeal dismissed, 333 F.3d 509 (4th Cir. 2003).
238. Id. The court also cited United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S.
858, 867 (1982), for the proposition that the evidence offered may be material
for either guilt or punishment. Id.
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of the court. Because Moussaoui met both,239 he must receive
access to the witnesses. A denial violates his right to compulsory process.
The government raised legitimate concerns regarding
granting Moussaoui access to the witnesses via deposition, including the risk of undermining interrogation and enabling
signaling. Regardless, in choosing to prosecute Moussaoui in
the civilian criminal justice system, the government chose to
abide by the constitutional rules governing that system. Therefore, the government must not obstruct Moussaoui’s right to
compulsory process. The proposed framework advocates a formal deposition as the only acceptable means of fulfilling Moussaoui’s right to compulsory process. In this determination, the
result under the proposed framework accords the district
court’s decision.240
At this juncture the proposed framework and the Fourth
Circuit’s decision part ways. Under the proposed framework,
the Fourth Circuit should have affirmed the district court as to
the form of substitution ordered and required the government
to produce the witnesses for deposition. However, the Fourth
Circuit performed a balancing test to determine that summaries of interrogation sufficed to effectuate Moussaoui’s right to
compulsory process.241 Although the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the district court’s assessment that the form of summary offered was inadequate, it held that the heavily redacted summaries were a sufficient basis from which to create written statements that would serve as Moussaoui’s only access to witness
testimony.242
This substitution falls far below the standard advocated by
the proposed framework. Substitutions based on summaries
lack specificity to the individual and inhibit, rather than enable, a defendant’s discovery of exculpatory information. The
proposed framework requires that the government produce the
witnesses for deposition as the only substitutionary means of
vindicating the defendant’s right to compulsory process. At that
point, the government must make a choice either to respect the
Constitution by producing the witnesses, as required in any

239. See Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 456–57, 463–64, 471–74.
240. See Moussaoui, No. 01-455-A (E.D. Va. Jan. 31, 2003) (order denying
in part and granting in part defense motions to compel discovery) (under seal).
241. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 469–76.
242. Id. at 479.
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prosecution in an Article III court, or to allow the district court
to dismiss the indictment.
Ultimately, however, no conclusive answer to this constitutional conundrum will emerge from Moussaoui. On April 22,
2005, Moussaoui pled guilty to the six counts with which he
was charged,243 after a denial of certiorari by the Supreme
Court and after years of thwarted attempts to gain access to
exculpatory information left him unable to present a full defense.244 As Moussaoui’s death penalty trial played out on the
national stage, it brought closure to thousands of 9/11 victims’
family members; however, it also brought to light the failure of
the judiciary to protect Moussaoui’s constitutional right to
compulsory process.
CONCLUSION
Moussaoui is the beginning, rather than the end, of the
story. The compulsory process question remains unanswered,
and the ongoing War on Terror will assuredly present more
constitutional crises. Vindicating the constitutional rights of
suspected terrorists while protecting the government’s legitimate interest in national security will challenge many courts
throughout the War on Terror. The framework proposed in this
Note ensures that defendants have access to a remedy for violations of their constitutional right to compulsory process, while
clearly laying down the rules the government must follow when
it chooses to prosecute in an Article III court. Once a defendant
can demonstrate that a material need exists for evidence in the
government’s control and that the court has jurisdiction over
that evidence, courts must effectuate that defendant’s rights. If
the government fails to provide the exculpatory information, or
a constitutionally adequate substitution, then the court must
dismiss the indictment. Put simply, the United States government faces a difficult choice: either respect the commands of
the Constitution required in an Article III prosecution or accept
the consequences of dismissal.
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